Our minzu studies should not delegate the minzu people in question to decide whether a minzu should be recognized as minority minzu, a separate minzu. Ethnonyms cannot be imposed from or altered by others. Our work is to study the formation of communities with facts and analysis, so as to help those who already proposed for an ethnonym to consider through consultation whether they should be part of a minority minzu or a separate minzu. These questions should be answered by the people themselves. It is their right." (Fei and Lin 2009[1957]: 157) The two predecessors clearly placed the study of minzu recognition on a subordinating role to the policy of ethnic recognition. They argued that the ethnonym should be decided by the people themselves, and is regarded as "ethnonym by owner" (名从主人). However, the way to realize "ethnonym by owner" seems unknown. This is a question worthy of pursuit if we look further at what Lin Yaohua (1984: 1) put in a quarter century later:
The two predecessors clearly placed the study of minzu recognition on a subordinating role to the policy of ethnic recognition. They argued that the ethnonym should be decided by the people themselves, and is regarded as "ethnonym by owner" (名从主人). However, the way to realize "ethnonym by owner" seems unknown. This is a question worthy of pursuit if we look further at what Lin Yaohua (1984: 1) put in a quarter century later:
In 1954, there were more than 260 minzu groups reporting their ethnonyms. Our preliminary survey found these ethnonyms to be very confusing. Some groups proposed self-appellation [as ethnonyms], some proposed appellation-by-others, and some proposed subgroup names. Surprisingly, some proposed their place of origin as ethnonyms, and some even proposed certain special occupational titles. Many local communities still had a strong common psychological feelings, though they spoke Chinese and underwent a long process of sinicization."
Now that the proposed ethnonyms were so diverse, why has the 260 proposed ethnonyms in Yunnan been reduced to 26 (including the Han)? What is the role played by the principle of "ethnonym by owner"? Who is the so-called "owner"? How did the owner "consider through consultation" in order to decide its ethnonym? Why were other ethnonyms abandoned?, and what were the implications? I believe a social historical study of ethnonym-making, helps us to better understand the current focus on the construction of minzu, and it deepens our understanding on how this process ends up with our present knowledge on minzu and nationalism. This paper examines the negotiation process of "Bai" as an ethnonym by analyzing an "ethnic symposium" Abstract: Based on archival studies, this paper analyses an "ethnic symposium" organized by the party committee of the Dali Prefecture in 1956. The author argues that determining the Bai as the ethnonym is a process of "name standardization". It was neither the decision of the state power, nor was it led by the scholar's opinion, but by the local elites' deliberate complicity with the state project. It could be thus called a process of "creating a common fate" under the combined principles of the discourse of "liberation-cum-backwardness", historical evidence, anti-discrimination, legibility to the ordinary member, conformity to the communist value, etc. It
Introduction
In "The Several Tasks of Ethnology for the Current National Work", the forefathers of Chinese anthropology, Fei Xiaotong and Lin Yaohua argued about the ethnic classification (民族识别, literally "minzu recognition") during the 1950s. They stated that academic study on the minzu recognition only plays a supporting role in the political decision of ethnic classification:
organized by the party committee of the Dali Prefecture in 1956. The author argues that determining the Bai as the ethnonym is a process of "name standardization". It was neither the decision of the state power, nor was it led by the scholar's opinion, but by the local elites' deliberate complicity with the state project. It could be called a process of "creating a common fate" under the combined principles of the discourse of "liberation-cumbackwardness", historical evidence, anti-discrimination, legibility to the ordinary member, consistency with the communist value, etc. It defamiliarizes the everyday knowledge of the people and creates a "liminal" stage by which a shared fate could be felt. The study was based on the released archives kept in the Archive Bureau of the Dali Bai Autonomous Prefecture. The fieldwork was conducted in September 2010.
Ethnonym and "Seeing like a State"
As far as "name standardization" is concerned, James Scott puts forward a classic view of "seeing like a state". Basically, the state transformed the local worlds into a legible structure by naming, through which the central government can administrate the local community. However, it usually leads to a loss of local knowledge (what Scott called "mētis"), and results in the failure of the entire program. For example, in Tuscany and England, the use of surnames was not a common phenomenon in the 15th century, and the state forced people to simplify their long and complicated names into combinations of given name and surname. This was done in order to have a proper and clear record of people's personal property and their tax situation. As a result, those new names lost its local information, which deprived individuals of their crucial connections with their family genealogies. Finally, it generated social unrest, such as Watts Taylor uprising which was caused by an unprecedented registration and tax assessments. Thus, there was a great tension between the state and local community in the process of "name standardization". Therefore, this was because "for English as well as for Tuscan peasants, a census of all adult males could not but appear ominous, if not ruinous" (Scott 1998: 68 ).
Scott's view was provocative to our study, but it also has limitations. Of course, ethnic classification was conducted by the state, with the purpose of making local communities legible to the state. There was indeed a loss of local knowledge, as 260 ethnonyms dropped to 26. However, name standardization does not only serve the purpose of state ruling or levying tax, as Scott suggests. The purpose of the name standardization project in China during 1950s was to establish the unprecedented political status for the minorities. As Nicholas Tapp (2002: 68) argues about the ethnic classification, "its avowed aim was the liberation of 'nationalities', however, these should be located, from feudal and semi-colonial forms of oppression."
Many who participated in the ethnic classification project tend to support the standpoint of "liberation" based on a narrative of "science". Lin Yaohua (1984) and Du Yuting (1997) held the view that ethnic classification marks the new development of Marxist ethnology. Li Shaoming (1998) suggests that a new development of ethnic classification has to depend on more in-depth ethnological fieldwork and the role of scholars. Among English-speaking world, the general view tends to question the "scientific" and "liberate" stance, highlight the internal discontinuity within the officially classified ethnic groups, and support the validity of unofficial ethnonyms (Brown, 2001; . For instance, Louisa argues that "minzu" is a creation without authenticity, and it creates the subject of the state. However, Pan Jiao (2010) pointed out that the nature of such comments was re-orientalising rather than de-orientalising. In addition, there seems to be a dichotomy between China and the West, which confuses indigenous peoples with migrant groups. The logical consequence is to reify an authoritarian China.1 Pan did not only rightly points out the prevalent tendency of blindfold deconstruction, but he also has no intention to save the scienticism of the older Chinese scholars. In this light, I suggest that we revisit the specific context in which ethnonyms were generated, instead of abandoning classified ethnonyms for the sake of diversity on one hand, or giving up reflections in the name of science on the other.
Based on massive archival studies, Thomas Mullaney did revisit the context of ethnic classification in Yunnan. He argued for the pivotal role of the scholars, who carried on the ethnonyms that had been around in the Republican era. In particular, it was Yun-nan: the Link Between India and the Yangtze by Captain Davis(1909) , which was "championed and only partly modified by Republican era Chinese social scientists, that became the foundation of Chinese ethnological studies of the southwest, the 1954 Ethnic Classification Project and, indeed, the presentday classification of ethnic groups in Yunnan" (Mullaney, 2011: 45) . Mullaney neglected the role of local elites and gave too much agency to the British Captain. The ethnic classification was not likely to be made by Captain Davis himself, who must have had no choice but relied on the local elites with such a classificatory knowledge. As some researchers argued that local elite plays an important role in ethnic classification, Harrell (2001: 42) put forward that "the project [of ethnic classification] is not a one-way thing, imposed top-down on passive local peoples. From the beginning, consultation with local leaders was an important part of the process, and from the beginning also, many if not most of the agents of the state who implemented ethnic identification and other aspects of the literizing project were themselves members of the minority communities. In other words, the language of ethnic identification is the one that can be spoken by people of all ethnic identities and claimed identities". Tapp (2002: 70) also rightly points out that during the ethnic classification, "it must, in most cases, have been the members of local elites who were questioned and listened to by the linguists, anthropologists and sociologists who carried out the project''. Due to the ethnic classification in Yunnan region, Yang Bin also suggests that we should study case by case. Some group cannot become a separated ethnic group because it does not have powerful elites. Elite becomes an important factor in determining classification. As a result, the outcome of classification almost replicates the imperial knowledge of borderland governance .
As Fei Xiaotong and Lin Yaohua mentioned, the study of ethnic classification is subordinate to the political recognition of a minzu. The agent of such a political recognition is the minzu members themselves. In a review paper on ethnic classification, Fei Xiaotong also argued that "according to the equality policy of minzu, the decision on classification issues finally depends on the wishes of the minzu people. It cannot be arranged by a proxy, not to mention any form of external force or imposition" (Fei Xiaotong, 1980: 161) . Lin Yaohua who directly supervised the study of ethnic classification in Yunnan, further stated the importance of "ethnonym by owner". Therefore, "ethnonym cannot be imposed on its people or changed by others. Researchers' duty is to offer scientific evidence for ethnic classification, seek for advice from ethnic people and patriotic personages, and help ethnic group to confirm its ethnonym by negotiation.
'Ethnonym by owner' means that an ethnonym should be decided by its own people, as it is their right" (Lin Yaohua, 1984: 3) . Accordingly, we can assume that, as the local elites of one of the largest ethnic minority groups in Yunnan, the Bai elites are likely to play a key role in determining their ethnonym. Combined with Scott's view on name standardization, this paper will focus on analyzing how local elites negotiates along the crack between "seeing-like-a-state" and local knowledge, what strategies and principles they adopted, and how these principles were relevant.
The Background of the Negotiation Meeting and the Selection of the Participants
In the official documents before 1956, Bai Zu (白族) used to be called Minjia (民家) or Minjia Zu (民家族). However, Minjia was mainly used in the Dali basin. Many remote Bai-speaking people had many other ethnonyms, recorded as Baimin, A Bai, Bai Erzi, Minjia Zi, Nama, Lemo, Lebi, Baizi, and Bairen. Some of these ethnonyms were also self-appellations, which also included Baini, Baihuo, Baizi Bainü. Fang Guoyu argued that Minjia was the product of the household registration system in the Ming Dynasty. At that time, the people under the jurisdiction of Tusi (imperial recognised local chieftains) were Tuhu (local household) and were called Tujia (local family). The immigrants managed by the Dali Wei (Dali Army Garrison) were Junhu (army household) called Junjia (army family). The civilian households administrated by the Dali Fu (Dali prefectural government) who had originally lived in the locality pertained to Minhu (civilian household), were called Minjia (civilian family). In 1656, the army household decided to withdraw, and Minjia gradually lost its connotation of the "descendant(s) of the barbarians". Fang Guoyu (1957: 14) further maintains that "linguistically speaking, expressions such as Nijia (you) and Tajia (he) were used to denote mutual courtesy and respect. That was probably the origin of Junjia and Minjia. Therefore, Minjia was a form of address used by the Han, but without malicious intent" Similarly, Australian scholar Fitzgerald (1941: 13-14) who lived in Dali for years also thought that Minjia was a neutral appellation.
At the very beginning of the People's Republic, the Chinese Communist Party promised a constitutional ground of "a unified multi-ethnic state" through The Common Program. The minzu recognition project which started from 1953 aimed not just to deliver the promise, but also to determine the representative quota for the coming first National People's Congress. At that time, Bai Zu (the Bai minzu) was used as an unofficial ethnonym, and so was Minjia. The government took no action to simplify other similar ethnonyms. However, there were already 27 ethnic autonomous governments or ethnic united governments and 784 ethnic village authorities established in the Dali Prefecture (大理地区). From the perspective of the state, name standardization had to be done to administer these governments. With the gradual implementation of the policy of Ethnic Regional Autonomy, the issue of establishing an ethnic autonomous prefecture (自治州) in Dali was eventually placed on the agenda by the end of 1954 . General Zhou Baozhong (1902 -1964 (Bianxiezu, 1986: 64) . As a local Minjia himself, Zhou Baozhong grew up in the agricultural areas in northern Dali basin. His wording of "Bai (Minjia)" demonstrated his own precaution. At this critical moment, as a local elite and senior party member, his suggestion illustrated the importance of ethnic elites in the process of establishing the political status of minorities.
The central and the provincial Party authorities also showed precautions. According to a document, with the establishment of the "Dali Bai Autonomous Prefecture", these authorities clearly instructed that "there were different views on which [Chinese] character for Bai should be used as the ethnonym. It could be decided after the creation of the Preparatory Committee [for the establishment of the autonomous prefecture]" (the United Front Work Department of Dali Party Committee, 1956). Exactly, Minjia Zu was inclined to be excluded and the bone of contention was to choose between Bai ( 白) and Bai (僰, pronounced as Bo in present Mandarin). As a matter of fact, both the central and provincial party authorities held their view that it was necessary "to unify the understanding", or to formulate a unified interpretation. This is because there were different views on whether it was necessary to retain the identity of the Bai ethnic minority or create an autonomous prefecture. According to Yang Yongxin (1986) , the first deputy governor of Dali Bai Autonomous Prefecture, many regarded the Bai as a branch of the Han, and there was no need for the Bai to become a separate minzu. Baizu Jianshi Jianzhi Hebian (The Combined Edition of a Brief Histories and Ethnography of the Bai) published in 1963 recorded some of such concerns: "the Bai and the Han are almost the same, and the implementation of regional autonomy is just an option"; "under the situation of the regional autonomy of Bai, can the rights of other ethnic groups be fully guaranteed?" (The Investigation Team, 1963: 247) .
The United Front Work Department of Dali Party Committee decided to hold an ethnic symposium before the establishment of prefectural Preparatory Committee. However, they put forward specific guidelines for the qualification of the representative. According to these guidelines (the United Front Work Department of Dali Party Committee, 1956), the representatives "would be chosen by the prefectural Party committee of Dali after the submission of the name list of proposed representatives and their biographical notes by the county's (city) Party committees." In other words, the representatives were chosen by the prefectural Party Committee. The principles for choosing representatives prioritized the representativeness, namely, "the representatives should be selected in line with the distribution and the proportion of the ethnic population. While preference is given to the "ethnic upper strata" (民族上层) of all minzus, the Bai should constitute the major pool. Majority minzus should let the minority minzus enjoy more preference, and [representative quota] should be allocated to the minzu branches too. Any minzu in the prefecture should have at least one representative." The use of "branch" ( 支系) here indicated not just the existence of different ethnonyms, but also a conviction that these ethnonyms can be simplified by one. In fact, "Bai Zu" was commonly used in this and in other previous documents. Compared to Zhou Baozhong's cautious use of "Bai Zu (Minjia Zu)", it shows clearer official proneness.
The seats were capped at 78, among which the prefectural Party Committee decided it to be 45. "Sixteen Bai people (out of 25 nominations), occupying 35.6%", were selected according to the quota, which was likely to be based on the Census data in 1954. It is worth noting that the counties of Heqing, Jianchuan, and Lanping which were Bai settlements, but had been under the jurisdiction of Lijiang Prefecture for centuries, were recently decided by the higher authority to be allocated to the new Bai prefecture. Therefore, the Dali authority had to delegate the Party Committee of Lijiang Prefecture to select six representatives on its behalf. In other words, the determination of the seats was quite complex, even to the point of overcoming the administrative barriers. Therefore, it happened to be closer to one of the Stalin's four criteria on ethnicity -a common area.
Representativeness should be in line with the revolutionary idea at that time, apart from other principles of "the ethnic distribution", "the proportion of the population", and "the ethnic upper strata". The seats determined on the principles of ethnic distribution should be "politically and historically clear, about those who are activists, role models in the socialist revolution, and prominent representatives of their ethnic groups". This is to say, that the representatives is highly involved in revolution. The representatives from the "ethnic upper strata" should be those "who support or least do not oppose the socialist revolution; and are closely related to people of the minzu in question, and act as great representative figures in their groups." Compared to the former, the latter is not measured so much by their being revolutionary, however "they should be very representing". Accordingly, the ethnic symposium that aimed at determining the ethnonym was called upon under the instruction of higher authorities (central and Yunnan provincial party Committees). Before the meeting, "Bai" was already preferred, and its "branches" were also beyond questioning. The administrative arrangement of the new ethnic autonomous prefecture about to be created followed this preferred ethnic identity.2 However, the seats still should be carefully nominated and examined in light of the ethnic distribution, population proportion, the ethnic upper strata, and political qualification in order to maximize their representativeness. Why then, were there still tremendous efforts to call upon a symposium intended to deliberate over an ethnonym that had largely been determined with a political consequence? In my opinion, the purpose of this meeting was not to find an answer to an unknown question, but to attain a shared understanding over a relatively clear answer. Hence, this understanding is an understanding about a common fate.
From Controversy to Compromise: The Process of the Meeting
After preparation, the ethnic symposium was held on the 25th and 26th of April 1956, in the Dali. Attendants reduced from the planned 78 to 28, by which there were "18 Bai, 5 Han and 5 from the Dali prefectural authority. From a perspective of ethnic distribution, the attendants were in accordance with the principle of representativeness. In addition, a number of representatives had collected opinions in their local ethnic symposiums, while some sent their opinions in writing. The symposium were 2 In addition to the counties of Jianchuan, Heqing, and Lanping obtained from the Lijiang area, the counties of Fengqing and Yunxian, originally part of Dali with a small population of Bai people, was handed over to the Lincang Prefecture. The hope of creating a "common area" is obvious.
recorded in a document (1956) of Dali commissioner's office in details.
The representatives consciously regarded 1949 as a watershed and emphasized that ethnic policy aimed to make the unacknowledged ethnic group, Minjia Zu, became an equal minority. Commissioner Y who presided the meeting, stated that "in the old society, the reactionary ruling class carried out the policy of ethnic oppression in order to maintain its dominance, making Minjia Zu afraid to admit its identity as a separated minority." Representative M from Eryuan County held the view that: "During the early period, under the oppression of the landlord class, we claimed ourselves as Han, having no courage to claim our Minjia Zu identity. It is until under the leadership of the Communist Party we dared to admit [our Minjia identity]." It is worth noting that the condition of the equal status is associated with the acknowledgement of the backwardness, and a consequent willingness to catch up with the pace under the help of the Han, " as Commissioner Y said:
Some people think that it is wrong to establish an autonomous prefecture to build an independent kingdom. Some are afraid that it is hard to implement autonomy on their own, and what can we do if the Party and the Han stop helping us. Indeed, the socialist construction of autonomous prefectures needs the support of the Party and the central government, and the help of Han people and Han cadres. Some think we should not seek the help of Han people and Han cadres because the Han once oppressed us in the past. However, the view is extremely wrong. For the Han people, they should be active and enthusiastic to help the development of the ethnic minorities, and it is very important for advanced minzu to help the development of the backward minzu. Some Han people and Han cadres think they will lose their status after the establishment of an autonomous prefecture, which was also wrong. Consequently, both the Han and the Minjia Zu have the responsibility to help the development of ethnic minorities and guarantee their equal rights.
What Commissioner Y emphasized was the obligation of the mutual assistance between the Han, the Minjia Zu, and other minorities in order to dispel the "worry" of a number of people. This view is certainly in line with the state's ethnic policy, but its premise is apparently the simultaneous existence of "liberation", "equality" and "backwardness".
Different from ethnic identity we are familiar with today, the representatives generally hold the view that the determination of the ethnonym and the establishment of an autonomous prefecture are special measures in catching up with the Han. The autonomous prefecture is a temporary arrangement. Its aim is to better complete the production tasks and achieve the same socialist system already in place in the Han area. Representative Zh from Dali County said: "the only way for our minorities to completely 'turn around' (翻身) is to unite and achieve socialism. The establishment of an autonomous prefecture is to accelerate the realization of socialism." Representative M said, "the importance of the establishment of an autonomous prefecture is about the realization of socialism. Only by establishing an autonomous prefecture and uniting all minzus to develop production, can we realize socialism". Some representative indicated that "establishing an autonomous prefecture is not an isolated plan, but part of the fulfillment of the five-year plan and the program of forty lines"; "The autonomous prefecture should be established; and likewise, production tasks should be accomplished." "Our region will become like Kunming after the establishment of the prefecture." The establishment of Dali autonomous prefecture was generally seen as a means for ethnic minorities to enter socialism with the Han after the founding of new China.
Why do they change the "name of Minjia that they have been so accustomed to"? Commissioner Y expressed the official opinion: To start with, Minjia is an appellation by others, while "the Bai Zu call themselves 'Bai Zi'". Minjia is used in contrast with the use of "Guanjia" (family of officials) and "Junjia" (army family), and contains the meaning of insult and oppression. Thus, Bai (白) and ancient Bo (僰) should be considered. Most people thought that Minjia in their regions has a derogatory meaning, and agreed to abolish it. However, a representative from Dali argued Minjia was commonly acknowledged, while Bai Zi is a derogatory term, which is in line with Fitzgerald's observation (Fitzgerald, 1941: 13-14) . Such debate also implied that from a perspective of pragmatics, the meanings of an ethnonym vary from place to place at least before 1956.
The next question was to choose between Bai and Bo. One of the representatives who intended to use Bo put forward the reason that "Bo had the meaning of cutting firewood, which implied working people, and that labor creates the world. The radical on the top of the character suggested two shoulders. The character of Bo indicated the image of ethnic people lively and meaningfully". "Bo is the symbol of working people. Therefore, it is proper to use Bo and is in response to the advocation that labor promotes the development of production nowadays." The best value of Bo lay in the fact that "it has historical basis", and was "created by the ancestors". Many historical evidences suggested that the Bai Zu was used to be called the "Bo people" (Bo Ren). Those who advocated the use of Bai argued that Bai literally means innocent, pure, simple, honest, and bright, the Bai adored the color of white, and there were legends of the White King and the White Kingdom. Meantime, several representatives thought that Bo was "hard to recognize", "unable to know when seen", while Bai was easy for the peasants to accept. In addition, Bai was beneficial to inter-ethnic unity, because the favorable color of the muslim Hui people in Dali region was also white. Zh, a representative from Dali County and a local master of Confucianism, held the view that "Bo indicates the life of ancient people under bushes and thorns. Absolutely, we should not use Bo because it is an insult to the ancestors." Also, he suggested the use of Kunmi (昆弥) found on many literatures, or Bai, because "the White Kingdom had existed since the period of Emperor Wu of the Han dynasty; and with the spread of Buddhism across Dali, people love to be simple and pure, and do not like to dye".
However, the character of Bai was also questioned. A representative from Binchuan County said that there was a White King, but he called himself Bo. Some pointed out that using Bai would be against Red. "Five or six senior people said that Bai offends red, the color of Chinese Communist Party." Some representative indicated that Bai in Minjia language was not a derogatory term. A representative also pointed out that "Bai" was "after all, a Chinese word". Those who were against Bai (白) were relatively fewer. Those who supported to use Bo also changed their mind the next day for different reasons. Some realized the character of Bo was hard to write. Some found that Bo had derogatory meanings only after others said so. The most important reason was that Bo may make people confuse the Bai with the Dai, because Bo was arguably considered as the ancestors of the Dai too. Representative H held the view that the advocating Bo lacks the awareness of enemy: "This question should be considered from the viewpoint of ethnicity and the masses. Using Bo may confuse us with the the Dai, which leaves a loophole for enemies. We should avoid such situation. Thus, I quitted my former choice and choose Bai, which means open, straightforward, pure, and honest."
The reason for confusion "with the Dai" would be seen as a lack of "awareness of the enemy" involvement with a famous academic dispute on the relations between China and Thailand during the early period of the Cold War. At that time, it was widely believed among the Thai and European academia that the Thai was the master of China who established the Nanzhao Kingdom, and then moved southward to found Thailand. Hence, this was as a result of the pressure from the Chinese polity established by the Chinese ancestors. Such a conviction was the cornerstone of modern nationalism in Thailand (Hsieh, 1993) . Chinese academia repeatedly wrote to emphasize that Nanzhao was not founded by the Thai in many articles from 1950s, especially after the Bandung Conference (see . Thus, the use of Bo indicated the confusion of the Thai and the Dai who took Bo as their ancestors, which may leave a pretext for "imperialists to split China". Accordingly, it was obvious to choose Bai over Bo.
The meeting did not vote at the end, but concluded with Commissioner Y's announcement, that all the representatives had agreed to use Bai instead of Minjia, and that he would report the agreement to "the provincial and central authority". Therefore, in April 26, 1956, "Bai" became Minjia's consensus and their new ethnonym. On the 12th day after the ethnic symposium, the prefectural Party committee reported the meeting in written form to the provincial and central authorities, which soon sent official approval in return. On 17th November, the Dali Bai Autonomous Prefecture was established and a grand celebration was held on that day. Authorities from Beijing, Yunnan, Sichuan and Guizhou sent delegations to attend the ceremony or sent congratulatory letters.
Creating a Common Fate
There are two topics worthy of examination in the minutes of the ethnic symposium: the negotiation progress and the value that the representative views follow.
During the period from the preparation to the agreement, there was no divergence on the enthnonym standardization. Despite of the question on whether to establish Minjia Zu as an independent ethnic group or not, around this meeting, the issue were beyond questions. In other words, for Minjia, the ethnic recognition has been completed, and the issue remaining is to decide the ethnonym.
On the decision of the ethnonym, the negotiation focus was not to reach a conclusion to an unknown problemthe official documents clearly implied the preference to Bai, and the negotiation focused on the formation of an acceptable consensus. It can be seen easily that even in the form of fierce controversy, the negotiation was not a progress about majority rule, but a progress that all the members of the meeting accepted the same opinion. The meeting records showed that many delegates eventually changed their stance and agreed on Bai. With regard to the representativeness which was strongly emphasized by the Party's committee, the consensus made the agreement to maximize its impact on the ordinary folk. This was probably the most important mission of the meeting.
In expressing opinions, these ethnic elites consciously applied the discourse of liberation-cum-backwardness, but never questioned the internal contradictions between liberation and backwardness -the co-existence of the logic of equality and inequality within the ethnic identity. Nevertheless, on one hand, the ethnic minorities who had been under the feudal reactionary forces of oppression should be liberated, and the purpose of the liberation is to let them obtain equality with the Han. On the other hand, the ethnic minorities were less developed as the Han in the social stage of development and the level of productivity, etc. It indicated that the ethnic minorities were in a backward position at the same time on an equal footing, which was expressed as political equality, economic, and cultural backwardness. The difference also could be seen in the realm of politics, which was the root of the query on the establishment of the autonomous prefecture of the Bai: "Is it a sign of founding an independent kingdom?" "Will we get the help from the Han after establishment?" "Will it affect the rights of other minorities?" However, only a small number held such view and they "just lack a better understanding of the policy of ethnic autonomous prefecture and come up with unnecessary concerns and incorrect ideas" (Diaochazu, 1963: 247) . The majority supported the establishment. This should be more or less the reality.
However, why did majority of representatives, support the activity of the establishment of an autonomous prefecture, including ethnonym standardization? Why can no one point out the internal contradiction between liberation and backwardness? I believe the key is that the representatives and CCP officials shared a common sense of history which is a sense of time of socialist construction to realize Communism. This is a common fate, which was the reason why majority of the representatives and the commissioner of Dali Prefecture held the view that its establishment, and the ethnonym was closely related to the accomplishment of the five-year plan, production tasks, and the construction of socialism. This relatedness implied a relatively short period of construction. However, both the representatives and the officials tend to believe that they were on a transitional stage, i.e. a "liminal" stage. The backwardness and difference between ethnic groups were temporary and would be quickly eliminated by the system of regional ethnic autonomy. Even ethnic difference would soon be out of use. That is to say the idea that ethnic differences will persist, which is generally accepted by the public today, was not the mainstream at that time. At that time, local elites and officials were unambiguously in complicity.
Apart from the two conceptual values of liberation and backwardness in the negotiation progress of the ethnonym, the representatives put emphasis especially on historical evidence. That is to say, Minjia, Bai Zu and Bo Zu (and Kunmi put forward by Representative Zh) existed in a variety of historical narrations. The historical narrations were certainly not academic history, but include historical documents, inscriptions, legends, and even old memories, what could be called "popular knowledge of the past". People shared a common consensus that the present is not only relative to a Social Darwinist future, but is also connected to the "past". Therefore, this was relatively familiar to the local elites. It is an alternative sense of time, and a past about the future. This was what called "a history of future". Another two values were to prevent discrimination and to accord the red symbol of the Communist Party. This was the case for the debate on Minjia, when discrimination issue was raised. So was the case with Bo, which suggested pejorative meanings. Bai was also questioned for its "offence" on the red colour of the Communist Party. Bo was excluded for its confusion with the Dai, which may leave "loopholes" to the enemies. Besides, a common-emphasized value was interesting in that the character of Bai is easy for the common members of the ethnic group to accept, and to write. The majority of the representatives accepted this value, thus making Bai outstanding from other choices. It indicated that name standardization is not just to create a concept "legible" to the state, but also to the common members of the ethnic group, which was highly emphasized by the representatives.
It is worth noting that, among the many values working in the negotiation, no one ever mentioned the four criteria of the ethnic groups defined by Stalin -common areas, common language, common economic life, and common psychological complex. Even the minority who questioned the independent status of the Bai based their arguments on a unique understanding of history, or the issue of whether the ethnic minorities would receive assistance from the Han, rather than drawing from the definition of Stalin. The Bai had the highest level of education in the Southwest, and there were many extraordinary intellectuals among the elites, such as Representative Zh from the Dali County, and a local literati who studied in Japan and taught in the Yunnan Military Academy. It is hard to imagine that they knew nothing about the Stalin's definition, but they did not have the willingness to consider the definition, nor did they face the pressure of considering it. It was usually held in academic circle that Stalin's definition was modified at the national level and was questioned at the academic level (Fei, 1980; Lin, 1984) . In this case, it can be seen that Stalin's definition on ethnicity was almost completely ignored in the knowledge system of local elites when it came to the specific operation of the local society.
All values that played an important role in the symposium can be concluded as one principle: the group who would have an official name should share a common fate with the Party and the state. First of all, the acknowledgment of "liberation" and "backwardness" enhanced the legitimacy of the Communist Party, the central government, and their undisputed leadership. Thus, the new ethnonym cannot offend the red symbol. Secondly, the exclusion of the connotation of discrimination was in line with the ethnic liberation to embrace equal political rights and the vision of the socialist system. Thirdly, historical evidence, in addition to a close relation with the sense of history in Chinese local societies (see Feuchtwang, 2001) , reflected an imagination of a community with an internal homogeneity and external heterogeneity. By identifying a shared origin and common ancestors, the representatives established a genealogy of a recognized population marching toward the future, and made its oneness legible. Lastly, the new ethnonym should be legible to both the state and the member of the minzu. The value tends to let as much people as possible -the people of the minzu in question and other groupsto approbate the identity that leads to future happiness, and "reify" this ethnic entity at utmost. The determination of the ethnonym of Bai transforms an ethnonym complex that were pragmatically intermingled, regionally different, and semantically ambiguous, into a singular, identifiable, tangible, denominational and mobilizable community. Thus, it became an administrative unit in the political structure of the state, a part of the entire social project, and a group of people who share a common fate with the state. The case demonstrated that the progress of determining the ethnonym is a progress of creating a common fate. Consequently, the knowledge of minzu is one about the state's future and a common fate. The local elites who shared the same sense of time with the state played a key role.
Conclusion
The ethnic symposium witnessed a hot debate on the determination of ethnonym. Many documents and reminiscent articles have the same record (Yang Yongxin, 1986; Shi Lizhuo, 2004) , and some researchers of the Bai identity have noticed it (Ma Xuefeng, 2011; Liang Yongjia, 2008; Shen Haimei, 2010) . However, researchers only emphasized the decision of Bai as the ethnonym, and neglected the progress due to inaccessibility to the primary sources.
The local elites who actively supported the state program played an important role in the progress of negotiating the ethnonym, in the sense that the ethnonym of Bai is the product of the complicity between the state and the local elites, which differs from the deconstructionist studies of ethnic classification by many scholars (like Schein, Gladney, etc.) , and Mullaney's view that the knowledge of the ethnologists "became the foundation of Chinese ethnological studies of the southwest." Moreover, many scholars have underestimated the agency of local elites to appropriate state symbols. The negotiation progress also questioned Scott's view on name standardization. Firstly, name standardization, with the purpose to create a legible structure, is not only to meet the need of the state, but also the demand of the masses, of which elites have an outstanding role in communication and suture. Secondly, deep distrust to state leads Scott to the emphasis on the selfish interest of the state -tax levy, conscription, and apportion. However, in the case of Bai, the state is not always a seizing monster, but an entity that has a strong ideal to change the society. If one only understands the name standardization from a perspective of the state violating the society, it is hard to explain the active cooperation of the ethnic elites and the general acceptance of the mass. Nor did one see how the knowledge about "minzu" were closely related to the state's program to change the society. The knowledge about minzu operated at the grassroots level in 1950s was not relevant to Stalin's four criteria at all. The key to understanding ethnic classification, the system of regional ethnic autonomy and name standardization, is the plan of socialist construction to a communist future. Like Tapp argues, "we may also need to remind ourselves that this was not merely a national, and nationalist project, but also a socialist one" (Tapp, 2002: 68) .
Any discussion of ethnonym in contemporary China plagued with rife and rampant context of ethnic essentials is easy to be labeled as "deconstruction". This causes possible dissatisfaction of the ethnic minority members. Among a number of issues that may induce such dissatisfactions, the active appropriation of the identities by classified minzu has become important during the last three decades. In my opinion, the appropriation by the local elites considered two facts: on one hand, the identity of classified minzu has become a "forbidden zone" and any attempt to historicize the minzu identity may cause repulsion among ethnic elites; while on the other hand, ethnic identity has become a fertile ground of invented tradition, and materials for a variety of projects such as cultural heritage. I am inclined to adopt Scott's position that this identity deserves respect, but not sacrosanct, because "All identities, without exception, have been socially constructed.… Quite often, such identities, particularly minority identities, are at first imagined by powerful states, as the Han imagined the Miao, the British colonists imagined the Karen and the Shan, the French the Jarai"(Scott，2009: xii, italics original). Scott continues to state that the identity will be seen as "a badge of honor" and leads to "self-making of a heroic kind". Thus, for those who devoted themselves to acknowledgment of some ethnic group, "I have only admiration and respect" (Scott, 2009: xiii) . Similarly, this paper does not intend to deconstruct the ethnic identity of Bai people, because deconstruction becomes meaningless when all the identities, including ethnic identity is deconstructed. The meaningful question is to ask the reason for anti-deconstruction, understand the use and meaning of "minzu" in specific social context, and carry out empirical analysis in the sense of sociology of knowledge. 
